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767 
THE SOCIAL COST OF BASEBALL: ADDRESSING 
THE EFFECTS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
RECRUITMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND  
THE CARIBBEAN 
Baseball is the U.S.-American pastime.
1
 Even endless debates over the 
significance of gradually declining ticket sales
2
 and television ratings
3
 
have not altered the game’s special place in the hearts of many North 
Americans. Its revered place in the social fabric of the United States is 
evident: from its historic ties to cultural ideals of “Americanism,”4 to the 
government’s fervent attempts to protect it from the tarnish of scandal,5 to 
 
 
 1. When baseball’s popularity began to rise in the early 1900s and it became a more commercial 
enterprise, “some promoters and former amateur players called for a return to the pre-commercial era 
when money was not associated with the game . . . help[ing] create the myth of baseball’s history as 
one defined by a pre-industrial pastoral heritage that was uncorrupted by the marketplace. This 
hearkening back to a “golden age” demonstrated the ambivalence felt toward associating baseball with 
the marketplace.” Robin F. Bachin, At the Nexus of Labor and Leisure: Baseball, Nativism, and the 
1919 Black Sox Scandal, 36 J. OF SOC. HIST. 941, 945 (2003). As a result, different groups called for 
baseball to be formally crowned the American pastime. Baseball’s owners, promoters, and fans 
embraced the idea of a pastoral heritage, separate and distinct from the capitalist marketplace. Id.  
 2. See, e.g., Patrick Rishe, Reality Check Regarding Downward Trends For 2013 MLB 
Attendance, FORBES, June 1, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/06/01/reality-check-
regarding-downward-trends-for-2013-mlb-attendance/; Ira Boudway, Why Are Baseball Fans Staying 
Home?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 9, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-
09/why-are-baseball-fans-staying-home. 
 3. See, e.g., Andy Benoit, Football, Baseball, and the Evolving Taste of Fans, THE FIFTH 
DOWN: THE NEW YORK TIMES N.F.L. BLOG, Apr. 17, 2012, http://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2012/ 
04/17/football-baseball-and-the-evolving-tastes-of-fans/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Joey Spitz, Is 
America’s Pastime Dying a Slow Death?, HUFFINGTON POST SPORTS, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/joey-spitz/is-americas-pastime-dying_b_3686366.html; Craig Calcaterra, Doomsayers 
Be Damned: Baseball is Healthy and Ratings Are Strong, NBC SPORTS HARDBALLTALK, Oct. 28, 
2013, http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/28/doomsayers-be-damned-baseball-is-healthy-and-
ratings-are-strong/. 
 4. Play and recreation became central elements in the fight to promote Americanism at home, 
both during and after World War I. Civic leaders looked to the organized play movement as a source 
for instilling patriotic values in working class ethnic youth in the cities. . . . The most effective game 
for promoting team spirit, according to play promoters and reformers, was baseball. They looked to 
baseball and its rules promoting discipline, order, and self-sacrifice as a means of instilling 
nationalism and loyalty in the urban working-class. Bachin, supra note 1, at 943–44. 
 5. In the 1920s, following allegations of illegal fixing of baseball games, then-Illinois State’s 
Attorney Maclay Hoyne began an investigation into the sport. Id. at 950. What resulted was the 
discovery of the infamous 1919 “Black Sox” scandal, in which eight White Sox players were revealed 
to have fixed the results of the 1919 World Series. They were charged with “conspiracy to defraud the 
public, . . . conspiracy to commit a confidence game. . . and conspiracy to injure the business of [White 
Sox owner] Charles A. Comiskey.” Id. at 952. The scandal is still well-known and has been 
memorialized in both print and cinema. See also Eliot Asinof, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND 
THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (1963); EIGHT MEN OUT (MGM 1988).  
 More familiar to many Americans will be the Congressional investigation into baseball’s steroids 
scandal during the early 2000s. In 2005, the United States Congress opened an investigation into the 
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its prominent and highly sentimentalized role in first the preservation then 
the dismantling of racial segregation.
6
 But baseball also embodies a more 
controversial reputation of U.S.-American culture: globalization, the neo-
colonialism.
7
 Overseas, the game is very much alive and thriving. For 
baseball, the concerns surrounding its expanding global influence are as 
troubling and significant as for any corporation calling the United States 
its home.
8
   
 
 
use of steroids in baseball, citing as one motivation for its attempts to redeem the purity of the game 
the negative influence that steroid use by baseball’s superstars would have on young athletes in the 
United States. Maria Newman, Congress Opens Hearings on Steroid Use in Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20050318friday.html. See 
also Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent Investigation into the Illegal Use of 
Steroids and Other Performance Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League Baseball (“The 
Mitchell Report”), Dec. 13, 2007, available at http://files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf. 
 6. Although baseball was somewhat integrated in the late 1800s, the game gradually became 
increasingly subject to racial prejudices, becoming completely segregated by the early 1900s. Daniel 
A. Nathan, Bearing Witness to Blackball: Buck O’Neil, the Negro Leagues, and the Politics of the 
Past, 35 J. OF AM. STUD. 453, 456 (2001). As the fight for racial equality rose to the forefront of social 
consciousness following World War II, baseball resisted change, despite mounting pressure. Id. In the 
words of author Robert Peterson, “Organized baseball was steeped—perhaps a better word would be 
pickled—in tradition. [S]ince there had not been a Negro in the organized leagues in the memory of 
most baseball men, it must be part of God’s plan that there should be none.” ROBERT PETERSON, 
ONLY THE BALL WAS WHITE: A HISTORY OF LEGENDARY BLACK PLAYERS AND ALL-BLACK 
PROFESSIONAL TEAMS 175 (1970); see also Bill L. Weaver, The Black Press and the Assault on 
Professional Baseball’s “Color Line,” October, 1945–April, 1947, 40 PHYLON 303, 304 (1979). 
Branch Rickey, the owner of the Brooklyn Dodgers, unexpectedly announced Jackie Robinson’s 
signing on October 29, 1945. Robinson played his historic first game in the Major Leagues on April 
15, 1947, tolling the bell for the segregation era in Major League Baseball. Id. at 305; See also 
PETERSON, ONLY THE BALL WAS WHITE at 198. For a thorough history of Jackie Robinson’s role in 
the integration of baseball, see TYGIEL, JULES, BASEBALL’S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON 
AND HIS LEGACY, expanded ed., (1997).  
 7. “A. G. Spalding, one of the game’s first great stars and its first significant entrepreneur, 
boldly proclaimed in 1910 that the function of baseball was to ‘follow the flag around the world.’” 
Alan M. Klein, Culture, Politics, and Baseball in the Dominican Republic, 22 LATIN AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVES 111, 113 (1995) [hereinafter Klein, Culture, Politics, and Baseball]. Author Alan M. 
Klein explains the theory of neo-colonialism as it applies to baseball:  
Andre Gunder Frank was among the first to explore the impact of colonialism in Latin 
America from a perspective focusing on dependency. In his view the relationship between 
colonialist nation (core) and colony (periphery) is one of simultaneous development and 
underdevelopment. The core nation expropriates the colony’s resources and imports them for 
processing and manufacture. Finished products are consumed in the home market as well as 
reexported to the colony. This dynamic results in the enrichment of the core and the 
impoverishment of the periphery. The system is often guaranteed at first by a direct military 
presence; in a neocolonial setting it can usually be sustained simply by the threat of force and 
the political and economic power of the multinational. . . . The same principles can be seen 
operating in the world of baseball. 
ALAN KLEIN, SUGARBALL: THE AMERICAN GAME, THE DOMINICAN DREAM 55 (1991); see also Klein, 
Culture, Politics, and Baseball, at 151 (discussing the colonial roots of baseball in the Caribbean).  
 8. As is the case for many major U.S. corporations, MLB teams are increasingly outsourcing to 
meet their needs. While overseas recruitment of players has notably increased over the past several 
decades, baseball can also thank Costa Rica for its baseballs (previously manufactured in Haiti) and 
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In the late 1800s, the emerging pastime of the United States was 
introduced in Cuba, where it quickly took root before spreading south and 
west, making its way onto fields throughout Central America and the 
Caribbean.
9
 In the United States, baseball’s expansion was similarly rapid. 
The first professional league, the National Association of Professional 
Baseball Players, started in 1871 and was closely followed by the National 
League in 1876.
10
 The American League began in 1901 and quickly 
became the National League’s most successful competitor at the ticket 
window. In 1903, the National League and American League played the 
first World Series.
11
 Major League Baseball never looked back. 
Professional baseball is firmly entrenched as a sporting institution in the 
United States. In 2000, the National and American Leagues officially 
disbanded, and were re-organized collectively as Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”), the corporate entity that serves as the collective nerve center of 
thirty teams operating in the United States and Canada.
12
 The Office of the 
Commissioner of Baseball in New York City manages the MLB.
13
  
Today, baseball’s popularity in Latin America and the Caribbean is 
obvious. With each passing MLB season, more and more Latin American 
and Caribbean baseball players compete on Major League teams.
14
 
 
 
Taiwan for its baseball gloves. KLEIN, SUGARBALL, supra note 7, at 57; Leslie Josephs, Made in Costa 
Rica: U.S. Major League Baseballs, REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/ 
03/09/us-costarica-baseballs-idUSTRE62831Z20100309.  
 9. Baseball was first introduced to Latin America in the 1860s. See ROB RUCK, THE TROPIC OF 
BASEBALL: BASEBALL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1–2 (1991) [hereinafter RUCK, THE TROPIC OF 
BASEBALL]. Cubans, who learned to play the game while visiting the United States, along with 
Americans traveling to the island country, helped to popularize the sport in Cuba. Id. Cuban players 
traveling in Latin America then spread the game throughout the Caribbean. Jose M. Alamillo, 
Peloteros in Paradise: Mexican American Baseball and Oppositional Politics in Southern California, 
1930–1950, 34 W. HIST. Q. 191, 192 (2003). See also Rob Ruck, Baseball’s Recruitment Abuses, 
AMERICAS QUARTERLY (2011), http://americasquarterly.org/node/2745 [hereinafter Ruck, Baseball’s 
Recruitment Abuses]. 
 10. MLB.com, The Commissionership: A Historical Perspective, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/ 
history/mlb_history_people.jsp?story=com (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Company Overview of Major League Baseball Enterprises, Inc., BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 12, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/research/common/symbollookup/ 
symbollookup.asp?lookuptype=private&region=all (in search box, type “Major League Baseball 
Enterprises” and press “go,” then under search results, select “Major League Baseball Enterprises, 
Inc.”); see also MLB.com (July 12, 2014), http://mlb.mlb.com/home.  
 13. See MLB.com, MLB Official Info, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/ about_mlb/ 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
 14. Latin American ballplayers: 
[N]ow comprise more than a quarter of all major leaguers, about half of all minor leaguers, 
and . . . dominate the ranks of the game’s best players. Latinos won half the Silver Slugger 
Awards—given to the best offensive players at each position in the National and American 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Coinciding with this shift in demographics is a new challenge, as Major 
League teams increasingly look beyond North America to recruit future 
superstars. MLB must balance international recruitment with rising 
concerns regarding the potential exploitation of foreign players and their 
governments. Unfortunately (but perhaps predictably), MLB has focused 
almost exclusively on the end result—the quality and marketability of 
talent on the Major League playing field—to the detriment of those 
players whose names will never be seen on an official box score, and to 
the places where they learned to play the game.  
As Caribbean nations develop and become more politically and 
economically independent, MLB’s international recruitment methods face 
increasing levels of scrutiny and criticism.
15
 The teams comprising the 
world’s premier baseball empire16 have discovered a wealth of talent in 
Latin American and Caribbean nations, where baseball is often revered 
and feverishly popular.
17
 In their collective bid to win games and bring 
 
 
Leagues—[in the 2010 season] and represent a staggering 40 percent of the players 
nominated for the 2011 All-Star game.  
Ruck, Baseball’s Recruitment Abuses, supra note 9. 
 15. See, e.g., id.; Neil Genzlinger, ‘Ballplayer: Pelotero,’ Baseball Scouting in the Dominican 
Republic, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/movies/ballplayer-
pelotero-baseball-scouting-in-the-dominican-republic.html; Jeffrey S. Storms, El Montículo (“The 
Mound”): The Disparate Treatment of Latin American Baseball Players in Major League Baseball, 2 
U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (2008); ARTURO J. MARCANO GUEVARA & DAVID P. FIDLER, 
STEALING LIVES: THE GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL AND THE TRAGIC STORY OF ALEXIS QUIROZ 
(2002).  
 16. “While numerous countries have baseball, basketball, and hockey, the champions of North 
American leagues are widely regarded as the best teams. In addition, MLB, the National Basketball 
Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL) are the most visible and leading 
organizers and promoters of these sports.” Mark S. Rosentraub, Governing Sports in the Global Era: A 
Political Economy of Major League Baseball and Its Stakeholders, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
121, 122 (2000). 
 17. In Cuba, for example, baseball has long stood as a symbol for independence and national 
identity. Louis A. Perez, Jr., Between Baseball and Bullfighting: The Quest for Nationality in Cuba, 
1868–1898, J. OF AM. HIST. 493 (1994). The game was popularized there as Cuba sought 
independence from Spain, which outlawed the game in an attempt to quell the influence of U.S.-
American culture on the country. Id. at 494. The attempt was unsuccessful: today, baseball is still a 
major sport in Cuba. Id. at 493. Two other Western Hemisphere countries where baseball is thriving 
are the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. The Dominican Republic has been playing baseball since 
the 1870s, when Cubans exiled during the Ten Years’ War brought the game to Hispaniola. See RUCK, 
THE TROPIC OF BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 4. Today, Dominican baseball is a complex, multilayered 
symbol of independence and national power in a country that still has strong colonial ties to the United 
States (ironically, baseball’s birthplace). See KLEIN, SUGARBALL, supra note 7, at 1–4, 34–37, 104–36. 
The Dominican Republic’s relationship with baseball, and with the United States, is complicated and 
fascinating, and deserving of much more attention than can be dedicated here. For a look at Dominican 
Baseball, see generally id. A brief except from Klein provides some background on the influx of 
Dominican players into MLB:  
[T]he number of Dominicans playing [in the Major Leagues] in North America began as a 
trickle in the late 1950s and early 1960s, then grew to forty-nine between 1955 and 1980 and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/8
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fans through the gates, these MLB teams aggressively recruit Latin 
American and Caribbean players, hoping to find the superstars of 
tomorrow. Unfortunately this process provides little reward for the 
players’ countries or themselves, short of the lucrative contracts that less 
than one percent of these players can hope to secure in the United States.
18
 
The goal of the MLB’s international recruitment should extend beyond the 
mere financial and competitive advantages it provides by developing ways 
to recruit Latin American and Caribbean players without disadvantaging 
the players, as well as their countries, in the long run.
19
  
Latin American and Caribbean countries should be financially 
compensated for the loss of native baseball players to MLB teams. Players 
recruited from Latin America and the Caribbean should be afforded the 
same rights and privileges as U.S., Puerto Rican, and Canadian players, 
and MLB should not be permitted to recruit them without some acceptable 
level of restraint or oversight.
20
 This Note offers one possible solution to 
 
 
to hundreds in the 1980s. Two factors were responsible for this rapid growth: the forging of 
“working relationships” between North American and Dominican teams, and a change in the 
scheduling of the Dominican baseball season from summer to winter. . . . The scheduling 
change made Dominican baseball a complement to major league baseball rather than a 
competitor with it.  
Id. at 35. This scheduling change has made baseball a year-round cultural presence in the country. 
Dominicans playing on MLB teams are followed by the press during the MLB season; attention turns 
to the Dominican Leagues during the winter. Baseball came to Venezuela sometime around the 1890s. 
See Jason Turbow, World Series Gives Venezuela Much to Root For, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/sports/baseball/world-series-gives-venezuela-much-to-root-for. 
html?_r=0. The first professional leagues formed there between 1910 and 1920. Id. 
 18. While there are many Latin American baseball players in the Major Leagues (as of Opening 
Day 2013, there were 89 Dominicans, 63 Venezuelans, 15 Cubans, 14 Mexicans, 13 Puerto Ricans, 4 
Columbians, and 4 Panamanians on Major League Rosters representing 24.2% of players (see Opening 
Day: Over 28 Percent of MLB Players Are Foreign-Born, FOX NEWS LATINO (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/sports/2013/04/03/over-28-percent-players-were-foreign-born-in-mlb-
opening-day/), they represent a very small percentage of the actual number of young ballplayers 
hoping to crack a Major League roster. See, e.g., Angel Vargas, The Globalization of Baseball: A Latin 
American Perspective, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 21，24 (“The well-known baseball writer 
Milton Jamail accurately observed that ‘[t]here’s not a kid in the Caribbean who reaches his 14th 
birthday without being seen by the major-league teams’”). 
 19. Nonetheless, MLB does have certain obligations towards its recruits and the international 
community as a whole. See Arturo J. Marcano & David P. Fidler, Ballplayer: Pelotero—Major League 
Baseball, Human Rights, and the Globalization of Baseball, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/26/ballplayer-pelotero%E2%80%94major-league-
baseball-human-rights-and-globalization (“MLB has human rights responsibilities, including 
demonstrating awareness of human rights issues connected with the location of its operations (e.g., 
developing countries), understanding how its business activities might raise human rights concerns 
(e.g., targeting children as sources of labor), and taking responsibility to prevent and protect against 
human rights problems connected with such activities”). 
 20. The primary reason that this is a problem is that MLB recruitment practices are by nature 
exploitative, of both Latin American countries and their nationals, including paying Latin American 
players much lower signing bonuses than comparably talented draft-eligible players receive. See, e.g., 
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MLB’s recruitment problems while taking into account both the interests 
of the recruited players, as well as the effect MLB’s talent recruitment 
efforts have on Latin American and Caribbean countries.  
The solution this Note proposes is a Coase Theorem
21—based 
compensation system, in which MLB teams cooperate with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries to support the fair and responsible 
development of baseball players. Under this system, MLB teams will 
financially compensate these countries for the right to negotiate contracts 
with players and bring them into the Major League system.
22
 This system 
 
 
Ruck, Baseball’s Recruitment Abuses, supra note 9 (“MLB has long benefited from the supply of 
talented players coming from the Caribbean, profiting immensely by signing players for tiny bonuses 
and discarding all but the few who make it professionally”); see also Vargas, supra note 18, at 27: 
Over-signing players is part of MLB team strategy to get Latino talent as cheaply as possible. 
Dick Balderson, formerly of the Colorado Rockies, refered [sic] to this strategy as the 
‘boatload mentality:’ ‘The boatload mentality means that instead of signing 4 American guys 
at $25,000 each, you sign 20 Dominicans for $5,000 each.’ Balderson’s statement 
communicates that he and other MLB executives see Latino children and young men as 
commodities-a boatload of cheap Dominicans, as if these human beings were pieces of 
exported fruit. 
Id. This is also a concern in Venezuela, where baseball scouts tend “to recruit underage players and to 
crush their baseball dreams through exploitation and false promises. In the worst cases, the officials 
say, scouts promise boys lucrative major league contracts, then take them out of local play to hide 
them from other scouts.” Id. at 25. 
 21. “The proposition is: That in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero 
transaction costs, the allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient and will be unaffected by 
legal rules regarding the initial impact of costs resulting from externalities.”  
 Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1972). One of 
Coase’s famous examples of this proposition is the problem of a cattle rancher whose cattle destroy 
crops on a neighboring farmer’s land. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 
(1960).  
If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, an increase in the supply of meat can only be 
obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear: 
meat or crops. What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value 
of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.  
Id. The damage to the crops (i.e., the effect of the cattle ranching) is an externality under the Coase 
Theorem. In economics, an externality is defined as the cost or benefit that affects a party who did not 
choose to incur that cost or benefit (here, the effect on the neighboring farmer, who did not choose for 
the rancher to raise cattle that would harm his crops). In a system where the cattle rancher must pay for 
the damage to the crops, See id. at 2–6 (“III. The Pricing System with Liability for Damage”), the 
rancher will consider the increased cost of repairing the damage if he considers increasing his number 
of cattle he owns. Id. at 3. The compensation amount will be the market value of the damaged crop. Id. 
For example, if each additional steer causes one additional ton of loss to the crop farmer, the cattle 
rancher “will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced 
(assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle), is greater than the additional costs that this will 
entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed.” Id. Two parties in an arrangement 
(cattle-related or otherwise) would agree to bargain for this type of arrangement so long as the worst-
case alternative would be more costly. That is, the cattle rancher would compensate the farmer so long 
as he still earned a greater profit than he would if a court granted an injunction in the famer’s favor.  
 22. This Note adopts Coase’s first solution to the problem of social cost: where the party creating 
the externality (here, the cattle rancher whose cattle harms the farmland) must compensate the party 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/8
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will in effect allow MLB teams to purchase a country’s interest in its 
player’s talent, so that a team can sign and develop the player as a major 
league prospect.
23
 Implementing and enforcing this compensation system 
will require the involvement of the governments of all participating 
countries or an international organization designed to oversee the process. 
It will encourage positive political relationships between the United States 
and Latin American and Caribbean countries by incentivizing 
governments to work with MLB teams in the development of young 
players. Because the supply and demand for talented baseball players is 
virtually unlimited, countries that are regularly financially compensated 
for the recruitment of their ballplayers will have a strong incentive to 
maintain positive relations with the United States.
24
 Part I of this Note will 
 
 
who suffers the damage (the farmer). Id. at 2–6. Coase also proposes a second solution, wherein the 
party who experiences the externality must bear the costs. Id. at 6–8. In this scenario, the party facing 
injury pays the injuring party to refrain from all or a portion of its activity, thus reducing the damage 
and the costs the injured party must bear. This note proposes a solution to baseball’s recruitment 
abuses by adopting the first scenario, for several reasons. First, the colonial history between the United 
States and many Latin American and Caribbean countries is significant, and a system that requires the 
colony to compensate MLB teams, which represent the colonial power (the United States), would only 
reinforce such a relationship. Second, the economic power of MLB teams is significant, and increasing 
that power through compensation by impoverished countries would be ethically questionable. Third, 
because MLB teams have access to significant revenue and will likely be willing to pay a superstar 
talent millions of dollars should he reach the major leagues, the sheer cost that these countries would 
have to bear to compensate teams at a sufficient level to reduce recruitment activities would be 
unworkable.  
 23. An explanation of MLB players’ contractual rights may be necessary for the reader 
unfamiliar with the sport. In the late 1800s, baseball owners developed an agreement intended to 
promote the stability of an owner’s roster and to prevent excessive offseason costs. Martin B. Schmidt, 
Institutional Change and Factor Movement in Major League Baseball: An Examination of the Coase 
Theorem’s Invariance Principle, 37 REV. INDUS. ORG. 187, 202 (2011). An owner would circulate a 
list of five “reserved” players that he planned to keep on the team during the following season. Id. The 
other owners would not attempt to sign any of these players. Id. This agreement was later extended to 
include all players on a team’s roster. Id. at 203. In a player’s contract, it was worded so as to give 
owners the unilateral option to renew a player’s contract—meaning that players, once signed, no 
longer had to right to choose which team they would play for (unless the owner decided not to renew 
his contract). Id. Although this system was clearly collusive on its face, the Supreme Court upheld the 
so-called reserve system in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Id. This 
system was maintained until the adoption of the 1976 collective bargaining agreement. Id. That 
agreement created the modern-day free agency system. Under today’s rules, a player is subject to the 
reserve system until he accumulates six years of major league service. After those six years, a player’s 
rights are re-assigned to the player himself. He is then free to negotiate a new contract with any one of 
the 30 major league teams. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the history of players’ rights in major 
league baseball, see William B. Gould, IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard 
and Watched ‘Round the World (with Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 85 (2000). 
 24. A rental system may relieve open or underlying tension between the United States and Latin 
American countries in at least two ways. First, by empowering the role Latin American countries play 
in MLB’s recruitment process, and second, by recognizing the financial stake Latin American 
countries have in the value of player talent. For example, in the Dominican Republic, a more regulated 
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discuss how MLB teams currently recruit talent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. It will also introduce the recruitment systems in other countries 
for comparison purposes.  
Part II will discuss current issues surrounding MLB teams’ recruitment 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. This includes discussion of the 
possibility of an international draft, difficulties with expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Major League Baseball Players Association 
(“MLBPA”) internationally, and the lack of a regulatory body to govern 
how MLB teams recruit in Latin America and the Caribbean. It will also 
discuss Japan’s system for regulating MLB teams’ recruitment of Japanese 
players for comparative purposes. 
Part III will propose a Coase Theorem-based approach to international 
player recruitment. This approach suggests the implementation of a 
compensation system, wherein countries are paid by MLB teams for the 
right to recruit talent as a remedy for the social cost of baseball. It will also 
propose a “public-private” partnership to regulate this system. Under a 
public-private system, MLB teams will negotiate directly with both Latin 
American and Caribbean countries and the players themselves in a process 
that will allow MLB teams to purchase the right to recruit the players they 
hope to bring to the United States. Part IV will discuss some of the 
problems, benefits, and complications that may result from a player-rental 
system. For example: general resistance to a change in the recruitment 
model, concerns with incentivizing countries to embrace the new system, 
concerns with enforcement of the system, MLB’s possible responses to the 
concept of player value, and the system’s possible effect on international 
political relations. 
 
 
and mutually beneficial international recruitment system may help alleviate tension over the fact that 
young players are often illegally recruited before the minimum signing age of seventeen. See, e.g., 
Vanessa Marie Zimmer, Dragging Their Devotion: The Role of International Law in Major League 
Baseball’s Dominican Affairs, 4 NW. U.J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 418, 422 (2005) (“While deception 
regarding one’s age is recognized as a survival tactic for impoverished Dominican players anxious to 
make a living, it is also a clear violation of United States immigration law and persistent violations by 
Dominican citizens could cause strife between the two nations”). Moreover, the overall social 
importance of baseball in Latin American countries may empower it to serve as common ground for 
discussions between countries that are in political tension or conflict. For example, a negotiation 
between the United States and Cuba regarding baseball player recruitment (currently restricted by the 
embargo) could be a relatively low-key starting point for more high-stakes political negotiations. In 
2013, a bill was introduced in Congress endorsing the exemption of Cuban ballplayers from the 
embargo. H.R. 215: Baseball Diplomacy Act, 113th Cong. (2013). A non-profit organization that 
advocates this theory is Baseball Without Borders, an exchange organization for youth that, “fosters 
international relations through baseball.” See Baseball Without Borders, BASEBALL WITHOUT 
BORDERS, http://www.baseballwithoutborders.org/ (last accessed Mar. 9, 2014).  
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO PLAYER RECRUITMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN 
International
25
 recruitment of baseball players is not subject to any of 
the restrictions or requirements governing recruitment of players in the 
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico (which all operate under the same 
system).
26
 In the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico, baseball players 
join MLB teams through a draft system.
27
 After players are drafted, they 
join the MLBPA
28
 and are protected as members of the union.
29
 The 
MLBPA has jurisdiction only over those players who are subject to the 
draft.
30
 MLB teams are barred from signing high school players in draft-
eligible countries, and the effective minimum signing age for those players 
is eighteen years old.
31
  
 
 
 25. Hereinafter, “international” will refer only to countries that are not in the draft system and do 
not have their own model to address MLB recruitment; thus, Puerto Rico, Canada, Japan, and Mexico 
are excluded for the purposes of this discussion.  
 26. The Rule 4 Draft (the first-year player draft, which takes place in June) is one of two MLB 
drafts. The other draft, the Rule 5 Draft, takes place during MLB’s annual Winter Meetings, and is a 
draft for non-first-year players. See Major League Rules 36–47, available at http://www.bizofbaseball. 
com/docs/MajorLeagueRules-2008.pdf (last accessed Aug. 19, 2014). It is the only one designed for 
amateur players, and is available only to players who are residents of the United States, Puerto Rico, or 
Canada, and who have never signed a Major or Minor League contract. Id. A person is considered a 
resident of the United States if he has enrolled in high school or college in the United States. Id.; see 
also First Year Player Draft Official Rules, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/ mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2014). The Rule 5 draft, for professional ballplayers, is also only available to players in 
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico (Roberto Clemente, a famous Puerto Rican baseball player 
and member of MLB’s Hall of Fame, is perhaps the most famous Rule 5 draft selectee). See About the 
Rule 5 Draft, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/minorleagues/ rule_5.jsp?mc=faq (last accessed Mar. 9, 
2014).  
 27. See Major League Rules 36–47, supra note 26. 
 28. The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) is the union representing 
professional baseball players in the United States. William B. Gould IV, Globalization in Collective 
Bargaining, Baseball, and Matsuzaka: Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 283, 286 (2007). The MLBPA, “was formed in 1954 in response to widespread player 
dissatisfaction with the operation of [MLB’s] pension fund . . . At this point, comprehensive 
bargaining agreements were first negotiated between the players and the owners.” Id. 
 29. When a player decides to enter the baseball draft after graduating high school, he can request 
to have his name placed on the Draft List. Zimmer, supra note 24, at 418. Once he is on the Draft List, 
the player then becomes “protected by the provisions of the current MLB Collective Bargaining 
Agreement.” Id. The agreement guarantees the player a minimum salary if he should be drafted by a 
team. Id. It also binds the drafted player to the franchise he signs with for six years. Id.  
 30. For more information on MLB regulation in the United States, see MLB-MLBPA Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, MLPBA, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (last 
accessed Mar. 9, 2014). 
 31. Id.  
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The system for recruiting players in Latin America and the Caribbean 
is very different.
32
 In fact, there is no formal system. International players 
are not subject to the draft, and are not protected by the MLBPA.
33
 
Currently, the only rule in place to protect the interests of international 
amateur players is one that forbids teams from signing any player before 
he reaches age seventeen.
34
 Nonetheless, this rule is not aggressively 
enforced and teams have developed various strategies to evade the age 
limitation.
35
 MLB teams also have considerably fewer financial 
restrictions when recruiting abroad.
36
  
An element of Latin American and Caribbean recruitment is the 
prevalence of buscones.
37
 Buscones are Latin American baseball scouts 
who recruit ballplayers.
38
 Buscones either recruit players for MLB teams
39
 
 
 
 32. For a better understanding of player development and recruitment in the Dominican 
Republic, see Josh Noel, A Hothouse for Baseball, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2013, available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-14/travel/sc-trav-0113-dominican-baseball-20130114_1_ 
dominican-republic-san-pedro-baseball-factory.  
 33. “These mechanisms are guarantees of rights players and draftees have earned through 
negotiations with the League and are considered vital in maintaining evenhandedness to both teams 
and athletes during the process of signing American, Canadian and Puerto Rican players to fill Major 
League rosters.” Zimmer, supra note 24, at 420. 
 34.  
The rule provides that a player who is not subject to the draft and who is not under contract 
with a MLB team can be signed by any team if (l) he is seventeen years old at the time of 
signing, or (2) he is sixteen years old at the time of signing and he will turn seventeen prior to 
the later of (i) the conclusion of the baseball season in which he signed and (ii) September 1 
of the year he signs. MLB teams act, however, as if this rule allows them to sign players 
immediately when they turn sixteen, but this is not what the rule provides. Thus, many 
signings that MLB teams trumpet to the world as legal are in fact violations of the MLB rule.  
Vargas, supra note 18, at 26; see also Major League Rule 3(a)(1)(B).  
 35. Baseball academies are essentially training camps where MLB teams hoard and develop 
talented ballplayers without the risk of losing any potential Major League-caliber player to another 
team. Vargas, supra note 18, at 27.” at 27. “Over-signing players is part of MLB team strategy to get 
Latino talent as cheaply as possible.” Id. At a young age, players are recruited into these academies, 
either by teams or by private individuals. For more on baseball academies, see id. at 28–32.  
 36. “[T]here is no floor on what a team may offer, and signing bonuses for Dominican and Latin 
players are small in comparison to those draftees receive.” Zimmer, supra note 24, at 423. 
 37. Tyler M. Simpson, Balking at Responsibility: Baseball’s Performance-Enhancing Drug 
Problem in Latin America, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 369, 382 (2008).  
Many Latino players who are signed by MLB teams attend so-called “baseball academies” in 
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. Most MLB teams have these facilities in these two 
countries. In Venezuela, twenty-eight of the thirty MLB teams operate academies [as of 
2003]. The numbers are similar in the Dominican Republic. The scale of MLB involvement 
in baseball academies means that for years, hundreds of Latino children and young men have 
passed through these training facilities.  
See also Vargas, supra note 18, at 24.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Buscones usually work with MLB scouts, who each represent a particular MLB team in 
recruitment-heavy countries. “If the MLB scout signs the player, the buscon almost always receives a 
portion of the player’s signing bonus for his role in initiating the relationship between the two parties. 
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or operate their own baseball academies, where they develop talent under 
little to no regulation.
40
 These buscones often “lure boys as young as 
[thirteen] to their own training facilities—with the promise of developing 
their baseball talent—until they are old enough to be peddled to major 
league teams as free agents.”41 Some of the boys are completely separated 
from their families while enrolled in the academies.
42
  
These academies operate like farm systems: young men spend their 
time training intensively for a chance to play in the United States, often 
forgoing education in exchange for appetizing signing bonuses.
43
 Many 
young men are coerced into taking performance-enhancing drugs or lying 
about their age, and, in some cases, they live in substandard conditions.
44
 
These players are young, vulnerable, and often come from struggling 
families that are not well-equipped to advocate for their child’s best 
interests, leaving the young men at the mercy of the buscones who run 
these “baseball academies.”45 Unfortunately, success for these young men 
 
 
That amount is negotiated between the player and the buscon, and MLB denies being involved in that 
process.” Diana L. Spagnuolo, Swinging for the Fence: a Call for Institutional Reform as Dominican 
Boys Risk Their Futures for a Chance in Major League Baseball, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 
274–75 (2003).  
 40. Id.; see also Ruck, Baseball’s Recruitment Abuses, supra note 9.  
The buscón will facilitate player development, create a market for their talents and drive up 
bonuses. Few buscones, though, see to it that their young charges remain in school; many are 
more like hustlers than surrogate fathers. They might steal from a boy, enmesh him in career-
damaging fraud (several boys have been suspended or had contracts revoked after being 
caught lying about their age) and even administer performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) in the 
guise of B-12 shots to add pop to a player’s bat or speed to his fastball. 
Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42.   
Former Dominican Commissioner of Baseball Papi Bisono recounts stories of worried parents 
reporting the disappearance of their sons. “She’d heard that her son had been taken away by a 
baseball scout. . . . The scouts who ran them kept the kids hidden: That is the real truth. These 
camps were hideouts because the scouts didn’t want their kids seen by other Scouts.  
Spagnuolo, supra note 39, at 269. 
 43. Ruck, Baseball’s Recruitment Abuses, supra note 9. 
 44. Id. One author notes:  
The greatest legal concern about how Latino children are contacted is that the actions of 
scouts, buscones, and agents are unregulated in the two biggest markets: Venezuela and the 
Dominican Republic. In Venezuela, for example, we do not have laws that adequately 
regulate the qualifications or activities of scouts and agents.  
Vargas, supra note 18, at 25.  
 45. Id. See also Adam Wasch, Children Left Behind: The Effect of Major League Baseball on 
Education in the Dominican Republic, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 99 (2009). “An estimated 
ninety-seven percent of these boys” never make it to the United States to play baseball. Id.  
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is rare, and those who eventually leave the academies rarely return to 
school and struggle to find work.
46 
More recently, professional agents from the United States have also 
thrown their hats into the recruitment ring by competing with buscones 
and MLB teams for the chance to be the first to sign a talented 
ballplayer.
47
 These agents present similar issues as the buscones, since 
some of them also exploit young players.
48
  
II. HOW BALLPLAYERS COME TO THE UNITED STATES 
Major League Baseball teams bring baseball players to the United 
States to participate in the Minor Leagues by petitioning on behalf of the 
player for one of three types of immigrant visas (the O visa,
 
P visa, or H-
2B visa) under the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States.
49
 
None of these visas are numerically limited, meaning that MLB is not 
 
 
 46. Diana Spagnuolo, in her comment Swinging for the Fence: A Call for Institutional Reform as 
Dominican Boys Risk Their Futures for a Chance in Major League Baseball, quotes the former Vice 
President of MLB’s Latin American Operations Lou Melendez:  
“We are aware of the problem with kids leaving school in the Dominican Republic to go learn 
and hopefully become baseball players. We are also aware of the fact that once they get 
released from the academy that they don’t go back to school.” Most of the children under the 
web cast by MLB are placed back into an impoverished society without an education, which 
leaves little hope for procuring a respectable job.  
Wasch, supra note 45, at 104–05. 
 47. Vargas, supra note 18, at 24. 
 48.   
The rise of agents in the process of initial contacts has good and bad aspects. On the positive 
side, a qualified, professional agent can act in the best interests of a child and balance the 
power and influence possessed by MLB teams. . . . On the negative side, some agents are just 
as eager as MLB teams to exploit naive, poor children and their families to get a piece of any 
signing bonus that may come along. Agents are copying the buscon system by setting up their 
own network of people to find prospects to contact.  
Id. at 25. 
 49. “O” and “P” visa petitions must be filed by the employer (the baseball team) on behalf of the 
player. The process operates as follows:  
Applying for the “O” visa requires that this large contingent of foreign baseball players 
follow two main steps. First, a baseball team must contract with the foreign player and file a 
petition with one of the four regional Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) Centers 
that possess jurisdiction in the area where the foreign baseball player will compete. The 
player’s petition for the O category visa must include the baseball team’s schedule with the 
specific dates and locations of each game. If the player is traded to another team, the player’s 
new team must file a separate petition. Second, approval of these “0” visa petitions requires 
consultation with a peer group in the player’s field. Baseball player peer groups can consist of 
other players, managers, or baseball officials as long as these individuals possess sufficient 
baseball expertise and can attest to the exceptional ability of the foreign player.  
Matthew N. Greller, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball Pitchers Yearning for Strike 
Three: How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League Baseball and United States-Cuba 
Relations, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1647, 1657–58 (1998). 
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required to limit the number of international players it brings to the United 
States.
50
 The O visa classification is the most restrictive of the three 
categories and it consists of three visa sub-categories.
51
 The P Visa covers 
a broader range of individuals and its eligibility requirements are not as 
strict as those for the O visa.
52
 The H-2B visa covers temporary works 
 
 
 50. While in theory each team can bring an unlimited number of players to the United States 
using the O and P visas, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (the administrative 
body that adjudicates such petitions, operating under the authority of the Department of Homeland 
Security), see Green Card Through a Job, USCIS.gov, http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-
through-job, is ultimately responsible for approving or denying the petitions based on an individual 
review of the petition in question. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 100.1, 204.5.  
 51. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(O) states: 
[A]n alien who:  
(i) has extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has 
been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim or, with regard to motion 
picture and television productions a demonstrated record of extraordinary achievement, and 
whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation, and 
seeks to enter the United States to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability; or  
(ii)(I) seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of accompanying 
and assisting in the artistic or athletic performance by an alien who is admitted under clause 
(i) for a specific event or events, (II) is an integral part of such actual performance, 
(III)(a) has critical skills and experience with such alien which are not of a general nature and 
which cannot be performed by other individuals, or (b) in the case of a motion picture or 
television production, has skills and experience with such alien which are not of a general 
nature and which are critical either based on a pre-existing long-standing working relationship 
or, with respect to the specific production, because significant production (including pre- and 
post-production work) will take place both inside and outside the United States and the 
continuing participation of the alien is essential to the successful completion of the 
production, and (IV) has a foreign residence which the alien has no intention of abandoning; 
or (iii) is the alien spouse or child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is 
accompanying, or following to join, the alien[.]  
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(O); see also O-1 Visa: Individuals with Extraordinary 
Ability or Achievement, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b9
930b89284a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b9930b89284a3210VgnVCM100
000b92ca60aRCRD.  
 52. INA § 101(a)(15)(P) states: 
an alien having a foreign residence which the alien has no intention of abandoning who:  
(i) (a) is described in section 214(c)(4)(A) (relating to athletes), or (b) is described in section 
214(c)(4)(B) (relating to entertainment groups);  
(ii)(I) performs as an artist or entertainer, individually or as part of a group, or is an integral 
part of the performance of such a group, and (II) seeks to enter the United States temporarily 
and solely for the purpose of performing as such an artist or entertainer or with such a group 
under a reciprocal exchange program which is between an organization or organizations in 
the United States and an organization or organizations in one or more foreign states and 
which provides for the temporary exchange of artists and entertainers; (iii)(I) performs as an 
artist or entertainer, individually or as part of a group, or is an integral part of the performance 
of such a group, and (II) seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely to perform, 
teach, or coach as such an artist or entertainer or with such a group under a commercial or 
noncommercial program that is culturally unique; or (iv) is the spouse or child of an alien 
described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien;  
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only, and has less restrictive eligibility requirements than both the O and P 
categories.
53
 If an MLB team’s visa petition is approved for a player, that 
player then has permission to apply for a visa to seek admission to the 
United States.
54
  
While for many recruits outside the United States, Canada, and Puerto 
Rico, the determination of whether a player is eligible to enter the United 
States ends once a visa petition is granted, some countries have more strict 
systems regulating internal recruitment.
55
 Japanese baseball players, for 
example, face an additional hurdle if they wish to sign with an MLB team. 
Japan’s system is designed to aggressively protect Japanese ballplayers 
from MLB teams looking across the Pacific for superstar talent.
56
 If an 
 
 
INA § 101(a)(15)(P); see also P-1A Internationally Recognized Athlete, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS 
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (MAY 4, 2010), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d 
4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=19860b89284a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&
vgnextchannel=19860b89284a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD. Generally speaking, the P visa 
is less difficult for foreign players to obtain than the O visa, and authorizes ballplayers to remain in the 
United States for longer periods of time. Greller, supra note 49, at 1660. 
 53. INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b):  
[an alien] having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning 
who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary service or labor if 
unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this 
country. . .  
INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b). The H2-B visa, unlike the O and P visas, is numerically limited; only a set 
number determined by Congress may be issued globally each year. See Cap Count for H-2B 
Nonimmigrants, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (Mar. 24, 2014), http:// 
www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-2b-non-agricultural-workers/cap-count-h-
2b-nonimmigrants. Baseball players playing under a minor league contract are eligible for H-2B visas 
because they generally come to the United States on a short-term basis each year (thus meeting the H-
2B’s “seasonal basis” requirement). See H-2B Temporary Non-Agricultural Workers, UNITED STATES 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/ 
temporary-workers/h-2b-non-agricultural-workers/h-2b-temporary-non-agricultural-workers# Qualify. 
H-2B visas do not require a showing of the player’s ability and are therefore easier to obtain than the O 
or P visas. See id. H-2B visas are seasonal in nature; for minor league players, this means they are 
usually valid only during the minor league season. See id.  
 54. See U.S. Visas, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE—BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, http://travel. 
state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/immigrant-process/approved.html. 
 55. Other Asian countries, as well as Mexico, also have systems in place to regulate MLB 
recruitment of players. The level of professional development of baseball leagues in these countries, as 
well as the popularity of their franchise teams, makes a difference in the ability of MLB teams to 
recruit these players: transactional costs are generally higher for MLB teams because the countries 
have regulated systems that require MLB to recruit only established professional players. See infra 
note 56. As such, MLB teams must compensate the teams for the loss of the player and his value to the 
team, and must pay the player a contract price that reflects his experience and skill level.  
 56. Japan and other Asian countries, as well as Mexico, also have healthy baseball markets 
(including successful professional leagues). See Korean Baseball Association, INTERNATIONAL 
BASEBALL FEDERATION, http://www.ibaf.org/en/nation/5702a4db-3cf1-4429-990b-fa7e106c2648 (last 
accessed Mar. 28, 2014); see also SITIO OFFICIAL DE LA LIGA MEXICANA DE BEISBOL (The Official 
Site of The Mexican League), http://www.milb.com/index.jsp?sid=l125 (last accessed Aug. 12, 2014); 
see also Nippon Professional Baseball, NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL ORGANIZATION, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/8
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MLB team wishes to recruit a Japanese player, it must notify MLB’s 
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball of its interest in that player.
57
 The 
Office of the Commissioner then reaches out to Nippon Professional 
Baseball (the highest level of professional baseball in Japan) to determine 
whether the specified player is available for recruitment, meaning he has 
not signed with a Nippon Professional Baseball team, or, if he has signed, 
he has played for that team for a period of ten years (granting him free-
agent status).
58
 If a player is not available, then his team’s approval is 
needed before he can sign with an MLB franchise.
59
 Once approval is 
granted, the Office of the Commissioner notifies the MLB teams of the 
Japanese player’s availability.60 All MLB teams then have a limited period 
of time to bid for the right to negotiate a contract with the player.
61
  
In the absence of similar governmental oversight regarding MLB’s 
recruitment in Latin American and Caribbean countries, MLB lacks an 
incentive to address its recruitment process.
62
 Furthermore, the current 
 
 
http://www.npb.or.jp/ (last accessed Mar. 28, 2014) (in Japanese); Japan and Nippon Pro Baseball, 
BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/japan/ (last accessed Mar. 9, 2014); 
The Official Site of the Australian Baseball League, ABL, http://web.theabl.com.au/index.jsp?sid=l595 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2014).  
 57. Gould, Baseball and Globalization, supra note 23 at 113. 
 58. Id. “Free agency status,” in the baseball world, means that a player has the right to negotiate 
and sign a contract with any team he pleases, and no other ball club has any right to limit or otherwise 
interfere with his freedom of agency. In Coase Theorem terms, property rights are re-assigned from his 
MLB team to the player once he achieves free agency status. See Schmidt, Institutional Change and 
Factor Movement in Major League Baseball, supra note 23, at 189. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Following this, the winning bidder then has a period of thirty days to negotiate with the 
player; if negotiation is unsuccessful, the arrangement lapses and the entire process ends. Gould, 
Baseball and Globalization, supra note 23, at 114. A similar process applies to Japanese teams 
interested in recruiting MLB baseball players. Id. at 113. For a more detailed discussion of the 
Japanese recruitment system, see Matt Nichol, Valuing Professional Japanese Baseball Players and 
the Role of Statistics, Economics, Culture, and Corporate Governance, 33 J. JAPAN. L. 119 (2012); 
Gould, Globalization in Collective Bargaining, Baseball, and Matsuzaka, supra note 28, at 290–92. 
 62. Recruitment in Latin America and the Caribbean is heavier and differently regulated than in 
countries in other parts of the world, or where strong national baseball leagues have emerged. There 
are a variety of reasons for this. First, these countries are geographically close to the United States, 
unlike Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other similarly situated countries. Ke Chen, Charles Gunter, 
& Chunhua Zhang, How Global is U.S. Major League Baseball? A Historical and Geographic 
Perspective, 77 GEOJOURNAL 429, 437 (2012). Mexico being an exception, as it has developed a 
strong national league and protects its players from MLB recruitment. See KLEIN, SUGARBALL, supra 
note 7, at 234–35. Second, these countries have a history of playing baseball that is nearly as long as 
that of the United States, and is in many ways tied to U.S. baseball “due to the military, economic, and 
cultural influence from the U.S.” Id. Third, the earning potential for young ballplayers who reach the 
Major Leagues, combined with the dismal economic opportunities they face in their own countries, 
strongly incentivizes the drive to sign contracts with MLB teams (even though those contracts are 
often for comparatively small amounts of money next to the contracts offered to drafted players in 
North America). Id.; see also ADRIAN BURGOS, JR., PLAYING AMERICA’S GAME: BASEBALL, 
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abusive practices in the region, while controversial, are profitable for 
MLB.
63
 Some have proposed the adoption of an international draft as a 
means to increase regulation.
64
 Similar international drafts are the norm in 
other major North American sports, for example, the National Hockey 
League’s Entry Draft.65 While the idea of an international draft, “is 
supposedly gaining momentum . . . such a ‘reform is likely to encounter 
resistance from the [MLBPA], which opposes restrictions on movement of 
players.’”66 While MLB is interested in a draft for the purposes of 
regulating team spending, negotiations thus far have been unsuccessful, 
and MLB shows little interest in implementing a draft that prioritizes the 
welfare of international amateur players.
67
  
It is also questionable whether individual MLB teams would support an 
international draft, as it is less expensive recruiting unregulated talent 
overseas than to draft U.S., Canadian, and Puerto Rican players, and it is 
less time consuming than working through a system like the Japanese 
model.
68
 Moreover, for logistical purposes, an international draft would 
require either the expansion of the MLBPA’s jurisdiction or the creation of 
 
 
LATINOS, AND THE COLOR LINE 237 (2007) (Noting that in 2001, the Cleveland Indians paid a total of 
$700,000 to forty Latin American prospects, while paying out nearly $1.7 million to the team’s top 
draft pick in North America’s amateur draft).  
 63. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the “boatload mentality”—MLB teams can 
sign significantly more players for less money in Latin American and the Caribbean than they would 
in the United States. Thus, the teams frequently sign many more players than they will ever have 
positions for in their franchise. Burgos Jr., PLAYING AMERICA’S GAME at 237. 
 64. See Jesse Sanchez, Baseball Decides Against Holding International Draft, MLB (May 31, 
2013), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20130531&content_id=49189442&vkey=news_mlb 
&c_id=mlb.  
 65. The NHL’s entry draft covers (1) North American players aged eighteen to twenty years old, 
and (2) European players of all ages entering the league for the first time. See Hockey Operations 
Guidelines, NHL, www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26377 (last accessed Mar. 9, 2014).  
 66. Jason S. Weiss, The Changing Face of Baseball: In an Age of Globalization, Is Baseball Still 
as American as Apple Pie and Chevrolet?, 8 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 123, 181 (2000), 
quoting Steve Martinez, Dealing with Defects; Now That Cubans Have Found Their Way Back to the 
Majors, the Majors Must Find a Better Way to Place Them, SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996; see also 
Zimmer, supra note 24, at 438 (“[T]here has been no action toward an international draft beyond [a] 
statement of intent . . . . it would require codification in a new Collective Bargaining Agreement, the 
terms of which are labored over, sometimes with the threat of a player strike by the Players Union”). 
 67. See Mike Rosenbaum, Why MLB Needs to Create an International Draft, and What it Would 
Mean, BLEACHER REPORT (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/1852789-why-
mlb-needs-to-create-an-international-draft-and-what-it-would-mean.  
 68. The cost-effectiveness of recruiting talent in unregulated countries is well-known. One 
sportswriter explains: “International signings cost a fraction of what teams pay for free agents and, in 
most cases, what teams spend for bonuses in the Rule 4 draft as currently constructed. They even cost 
less than the baseball operations budgets of most teams. Meaning executives, coaches, scouts and 
coordinators’ salaries.” Craig Calcaterra, An international draft could be here sooner than you think. 
And it’s still a terrible idea, HARDBALLTALK.COM (Mar. 18, 2013), http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/ 
2013/03/18/an-international-draft-could-be-here-sooner-than-you-think-and-its-still-a-terrible-idea/. 
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a similar union for international ballplayers so that drafted players would 
be subject to the same restrictions and protections as Rule 4 draft-eligible 
players.
69
 Finally, an international draft would require the consent of both 
sovereign nations and their players, who have their own collective and 
individual motivations in either supporting or resisting the creation of a 
draft.
70
 Some governments benefit financially from MLB’s unregulated 
recruitment,
71
 which may outweigh concerns over the welfare of native 
ballplayers. Disparities in negotiating power may also affect a country’s 
willingness to sign onto a draft system.
72
 Furthermore, because countries 
 
 
 69. Players under MLBPA’s jurisdiction may resist the expansion of that jurisdiction 
internationally, as expansion could affect those players’ ability to compete at the major league level. 
The market would see an influx of talented players representing those countries the MLBPA 
previously did not cover. MLB would likely also resist such an expansion, since an expansion of union 
jurisdiction would mean fewer sources of cheap talent with weak negotiating power. Further, foreign 
countries may resist changes to the existing structure of MLBPA.  
 70. The Dominican Republic has voiced its concern with an international draft:  
 Felipe Payano, the [Dominican Republic’s] sports minister, has already written a letter to 
Bud Selig, MLB’s commissioner, expressing his opposition to a draft. He says his office is 
investigating whether it might violate the DR’s free-trade agreement with America. Another 
option would be to sue MLB for collusion under Dominican antitrust law.  
Baseball in Latin America: Draft Dodgers No More, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2012, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21546064?frsc=dg%7Ca. Also, some argue that an international draft 
might be discouraged by international players. See Jeff Wilson, MLB Insider: Many glad to see plans 
for international draft put on shelf, Star-Telegram, June 8, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20131421090500/http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/06/08/4921958/mlb-insider-many-glad-to-see-
plans.html (accessed by searching for http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/06/08/4921958/mlb-insider-
many-glad-to-see-plans.html?rh=1 in the Internet Archive Index). For context, it is helpful to look to 
the changes Puerto Rican recruitment has undergone since 1990, when the state became subject to the 
Rule 4 Draft:  
[T]he number of Puerto Ricans in the majors has dropped steeply. Many of the game’s 
greatest players are from Puerto Rico . . . but fewer than 30 were on major league rosters to 
start the season. One is Geovany Soto, an 11th-round pick in 2001. He said that players in the 
U.S. territory are scouted, but the baseball infrastructure there is lacking relative to the United 
States. As such, players don’t play or practice as often and have considerably poorer facilities, 
and scouts aren’t as likely to commit to a Puerto Rican prospect the way they would an 
American—with 2012 No. 1 overall pick Carlos Correa a recent exception. No one doubts 
that baseball there is on the decline, and some point to the draft as a main culprit.  
Id; see also Storms, supra note 15, at 99: 
In fact, Puerto Rico recently expressed a desire to be excluded from the . . . draft, as its 
players are failing to be drafted at all because it is more economically attractive to sign talent 
from non-draft countries . . . Thus, given the reported problems with the Puerto Rican model, 
any proposal to expand the draft will likely have opponents on both the supply and demand 
side.  
 71. For example, the Dominican Republic. See Klein, supra note 8; Ruck, THE TROPIC OF 
BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 34–41. 
 72. One author has argued that, for the creation of an international draft, “the prerequisite will be 
a negotiated international labor market, like that contained in the U.S.-Japanese agreement, where 
foreign country organizations will not perceive themselves to be threatened by American baseball 
imperialism.” Gould, supra note 23, at 120.  
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are not directly involved in the recruitment, signing, or transportation of 
baseball players, they may not be in an ideal position to identify problems 
or develop and implement solutions to those problems. Moreover, the 
United States itself does not regulate MLB’s international recruitment 
strategies outside of practices beyond the umbrella of immigration law.
73
  
Another issue is that the MLB teams are not strongly incentivized to 
self-regulate their recruitment based on moral or human rights arguments, 
due to the significant financial upside that can result from unregulated 
recruitment.
74
 In fact, the competition between its teams contributes to this 
problem, as any team which might decide to self-regulate its own 
international recruitment would be at a competitive disadvantage to those 
teams that recruit internationally without restraint.
75
 This would only 
exacerbate competitive imbalances between teams, something that would 
likely impact MLB’s ability to compete with other professional sports and 
keep fans engaged in its annual pennant and wild card races.  
An alternative option for Caribbean and Latin American countries 
might be the adoption of a system similar to that of Japan; however, it is 
unlikely that a recruitment system similar to the Japanese model would be 
effective in Latin America. First, the political relationships between the 
U.S. and Japan and the U.S. and Latin America are worlds apart. Japan is a 
developed country that has minimal geographic or historical ties to Latin 
America and the Caribbean. With the increase of baseball’s popularity in 
Japan, the country has affirmatively chosen to protect its own baseball 
leagues from the reach of MLB.
76
 Many Caribbean and Latin American 
countries have a more complicated history with the United States 
 
 
 73. An MLB team need only successfully petition for an MLB player. If a petition is approved, 
the player can then seek admission to the United States. Once a player is admitted, he may enter for the 
duration of time granted by the U.S. government. See U.S. Visas, supra notes 49–54. 
 74. Support for this view comes from an analysis of the Coase Theorem in the MLB context. In 
terms of contractual agreements with players, the Coase Theorem assumes that a team’s goal is the 
maximization of profit. See Schmidt, Institutional Change and Factor Movement in Major League 
Baseball, supra note 23, at 201 (2011). Alternatively, the player’s goal is maximizing income. Id. 
Interestingly, some argue that the current recruitment system is in some sense beneficial on the level of 
the individual player because it offers the player an opportunity to sign for amounts of money that, in 
the absence of MLB recruitment, would in all likelihood never be available to him. See KLEIN, 
SUGARBALL, supra note 7, at 59. However, the benefits to the individual at the time he is under 
contract with an MLB team does not outweigh or otherwise diminish the effects the recruitment 
process has on a country on institutional and cultural levels. Id. at 57–61. 
 75. Something similar happened when Latin American and Caribbean recruitment began in 
Major League Baseball. When MLB teams realized that talented young Latin American and Caribbean 
ballplayers could be had for significantly less financial outlay than North American players, they 
began to compete with one another in earnest to find and sign talent in the region. See KLEIN, 
SUGARBALL, supra note 7, at 42, 53–55.  
 76. See Gould, supra note 23, at 113–14.  
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stemming from as far back as the years of United States’ founding 
fathers.
77
 As the United States grew in economic power and political 
influence, its leaders saw Caribbean and Latin countries as nations in need 
of guidance and control.
78
 As a result, professional baseball clubs in the 
United States maintained close ties to their Caribbean and Latin American 
counterparts, in many ways mirroring the colonial relationship between 
the U.S. and parts of the Western Hemisphere.
79
 Reflecting these closer 
geographic, social, and political ties, Latin American baseball leagues and 
players have been involved with United States professional baseball since 
the early 1900s,
80
 whereas Japanese players have grown up in an 
economically stable country free from the historical colonial influence of 
the United States.
81
 
Second, international countries attempting to mirror the Japanese 
model would face the challenge of creating their own regulatory systems 
for player recruitment. As a result, MLB teams would need to familiarize 
themselves with these systems individually as they are adopted and 
comply with each country’s specific rules and regulations, something that 
would be time-consuming and costly. Moreover, Latin American and 
Caribbean countries would need to independently decide to organize and 
adopt such systems. Recruitment systems as restrictive as the Japanese 
model might be counterintuitive in many Caribbean and Latin American 
countries where leagues are much less financially stable than the Nippon 
 
 
 77. See Ruck, THE TROPIC OF BASEBALL, supra note 9, at 22–23 (“‘History,’ Thomas Jefferson 
wrote “furnishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government”). The 
United States’ intervention in Western Hemisphere affairs continued well past its own declaration of 
independence from colonial power. Id. The Spanish-American War (1898), a result of the United 
States’ intervention in Cuba’s war for independence from Spain, is one such example. Id. As a result 
of its victory against Spain, the United States was awarded control over Cuba and Puerto Rico, Spain’s 
sole remaining territories in the Caribbean basin. Id. Although liberated from Spanish influence, Cuba 
and Puerto Rico were essentially trading one occupation for another—the result of two global super 
powers exchanging the final colonial assets of the once-extensive Spanish new world empire. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. “The academy is the baseball counterpart of the colonial outpost, the physical embodiment 
overseas of the parent franchise. It operates more or less like the subsidiary of any other foreign 
company: it finds raw materials (talented athletes), refines them (trains the athletes), and ships abroad 
finished products (baseball players).” See KLEIN, SUGARBALL, supra note 7, at 42. 
 80. Id. at 35; see also Adrian Burgos, Playing Ball in a Black and White “Field of Dreams”: 
Afro-Caribbean Ballplayers in the Negro Leagues, 1910–1950, 82 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 67, 75 (1997) 
(“In the Dominican Republic, the United States’ military occupation (1915–1924) led to new political 
connotations being bestowed onto baseball . . . Numerous games were played between the Marines and 
the Dominicans; yet those who lived through the occupation still debate the meaning attached to these 
games”).  
 81. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: JAPAN (Introduction and 
Economy subheadings), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/ja.html. 
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Professional League, cannot compete with MLB salaries, and depend in 
part on the national popularity of their players who reach the Major 
Leagues.
82
 Considering these factors alongside the relative complexity of 
the Japanese system, individual and independently-created recruitment 
systems are not a desirable or workable solution for Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  
Ultimately, baseball’s cultural role in many Latin American and 
Caribbean countries creates independent challenges to the implementation 
of a new system. For example, in countries like the Dominican Republic, 
baseball is as much a patriotic enterprise as a source of entertainment.
83
 
Many young men who lack substantial educational opportunities at home 
view it as an ideal career path because of the potential (however slim) for 
great financial success in the United States.
84
 As a result of the large 
contracts that the most talented Latin American ballplayers are awarded by 
MLB teams, playing ball in the United States has attained a romanticized 
status-for lucky young players, fame, fortune, and the promise of a better 
life can be won through hard work and dedication on the baseball 
diamond.
85
 While a perpetuation of the current system means that the 
supply of hopeful ballplayers will likely never disappear, it also means 
that young players will continue to sacrifice their futures at home in the 
hopes of being one of the few who make it in the big leagues.   
 
 
 82. See RUCK, THE TROPICS OF BASEBALL, supra note 9, at xviii–xx. 
 83. See KLEIN, SUGARBALL, supra note 7, at 1–2.  
In the Domincan Republic, baseball has become much more than a game, even more than a 
national pastime; it is a crucial arena of intercultural relations, in which significance attaches 
to everything about the game, its symbols, and its players. In the Dominican Republic 
baseball has a place all out of proportion to the normal one of sport in society. . . . [C]utting 
[sugar] cane continues to be the most easily obtained employment in the country. It is also the 
future many men fear for themselves if baseball should fail them, all of which further elevates 
the status of baseball in the Dominican Republic. 
 84. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 24, at 425: 
Dominican dependence on Major League Baseball for economic revenue has assured the 
League a favorable position with the Dominican Government. The economic crutch Major 
League Baseball supplies cannot be understated: a study conducted by Major League Baseball 
in June of 2003 showed that it injects $76 million annually into the Dominican economy 
through payments to players, scouting trips and donations. $14.7 million of the sum is paid 
directly to the Dominican Republic by thirty baseball academies that are run by Major League 
teams in conjunction with baseball’s Dominican office. The same study shows the League has 
created 1,200 jobs in the Caribbean nation. 
 85. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/8
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE SOCIAL COST OF BASEBALL 787 
 
 
 
 
III. A COASE THEOREM-BASED ANALYSIS 
This Note looks to the Coase Theorem
86
 for a solution to the social cost 
of Major League Baseball recruitment in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
87
 It first proposes that a ballplayer’s country should have a 
voice in how its players are recruited and developed by MLB teams.
88
 It 
theorizes that regardless of whether solely the player himself, or both the 
player and his country of origin possess property rights (i.e., his right to 
contract with an MLB team) in a player’s baseball talent, MLB teams will 
ultimately be able to secure the rights to negotiate a contract with the 
player because recruiting players in the Latin American and Caribbean 
market will remain beneficial for MLB teams under a cost-benefit 
 
 
 86. One author summarizes how the Coase Theorem applies to Major League Baseball:  
Coase stated that with zero transaction costs and neutral wealth effects, the allocation of 
resources is independent of the initial assignment of property rights. In the case of baseball 
contracts, we have observed that the allocation of risk bearing is dependent on the initial 
assignment of the right to players’ services. Since the transaction costs associated with the 
allocation of risk bearing between players and club owners are presumably low, this observed 
relationship suggests the following: the value which players place on insuring their stream of 
income, relative to the value which clubs place on the option to renew the players’ contracts 
annually, is dependent on the assignment of the right to the players’ services.  
Kenneth Lehn, Property Rights, Risk Sharing, and Player Disability in Major League Baseball, 25 J.L. 
& ECON. 343, 353 (1982).  
 87. For further reading on the application of the Coase Theorem to Major League Baseball, see 
Timothy R. Hylan, The Coase Theorem, Free Agency, and Major League Baseball: A Panel Study of 
Pitcher Mobility from 1961 to 1992, 62 S. ECON. J. 1029 (1996); see also Donald Cymrot et al., 
‘Who’s on first’: an empirical test of the Coase Theorem in baseball, 33 APPLIED ECONOMICS 593 
(2001); David G. Surdam, The Coase Theorem and Player Movement in Major League Baseball, 7 J. 
OF SPORTS ECON. 201, 202 (2006).  
 88. This proposal is intended to reflect the systems that exist in countries like Japan and Mexico. 
In those countries, players do not have the option to enter the MLB until they have attained a certain 
level of professional sophistication: meaning that these players have already been drafted and have 
played a certain number of years for teams in their countries. BURGOS JR., PLAYING AMERICA’S GAME 
at 238. Because these players have already been signed to contracts with professional teams, those 
teams have some control over an MLB team’s ability to sign the player, and are financially 
compensated by the MLB team. Id. Moreover, because these leagues are financially successful and 
have a strong fan base, the government has typically established some legal recruitment regime that 
prohibits MLB teams from recruiting players without approval (such approval, when granted, usually 
extends only to a particular player who has already expressed an interest in playing in the United 
States). As a benefit in these situations, recruited players themselves have some degree of bargaining 
power due to (1) their elevated skill level, (2) experience in contract negotiation, and (3) likely 
representation by a professional agent. This note attempts to replicate this type of systems in countries 
where a strong national league is not the norm (and thus, players are usually recruited at an amateur 
level), by replacing the league/individual team’s role with the government, whose participation is 
required by an independent body governing the compensation system. That is, when MLB teams 
recruit Latin American and Caribbean players, they must also include the government of the country in 
negotiations, and financially compensate the country for the recruitment of those players. This will 
effectively compensate the country for the negative impacts that will result from the player’s departure 
to the United States.  
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analysis.
89
 The proposed Coase Theorem-based recruitment model begins 
with the assumption that a country has an interest in the economic value of 
its citizen baseball player’s talent. This allows the country to serve as a 
stand-in for a local professional baseball team that might sign and develop 
the player if he is not recruited by MLB. An MLB team that signs that 
baseball player is thus required to compensate his country for the loss of 
its interest in the economic value of the player’s abilities; in essence, 
buying out the country’s interest. This is analogous to MLB purchasing 
negotiation rights to an international player from the club he has signed 
with.
90
 After a pre-determined period of time, an MLB team will have 
 
 
 89. When compared to signing players in North America or more regulated markets (such as 
Japan or Mexico). Lehn, supra note 86, at 353. Consider, for example, the case of famous ballplayer 
Alex Rodriguez, a U.S. citizen. Rodriguez was selected by the Seattle Mariners in the 1993 amateur 
draft. His signing bonus was $1.3 million. See PLAYING AMERICA’S GAME, supra note 62, at 233. Had 
he been an undrafted free agent from the Dominican Republic, Rodriguez may have drawn only five or 
ten thousand dollars. Id. Klein goes on to note that protecting Latino players has not been a priority, 
largely because MLB teams seek these players because they can be signed so inexpensively. Id. As 
such, increasing the transactional costs to MLB teams for these players relative to numbers comparable 
to North American draftees would defeat the purposes behind their recruitment.  
 The transactional costs are also significantly lower in Latin American and Caribbean countries 
than for countries with systems in place to protect their players from recruitment. For example, Yu 
Darvish, a talented Japanese pitcher, was made available to MLB teams before the 2012 season. Bob 
Elliott, Jays lose Davish bidding war to Rangers, TORONTO SUN (Dec. 19, 2011) http://www.toronto 
sun.com/2011/12/19/will-cost-of-darvish-be-too-high. As required by the Japanese system, interested 
MLB teams submitted bids for the right to negotiate with Darvish. The Texas Rangers were the lucky 
winners at $51.7 million. Id. The Rangers then were able to negotiate a contract with Darvish for $60 
million over six years. Id. Thus, in total, the Rangers spent upwards of $110 million for a pitcher 
whose ability to transition to North American baseball (which requires different skills and abilities 
than Japanese ball) was yet to be known. The transactional costs to MLB for a player like Darvish are 
astronomically higher than for Latin American and Caribbean free agents. In fact, an MLB team could 
likely sign several dozen players for less than the total cost of negotiating with and signing Darvish, 
significantly narrowing the risk, statistically speaking, that the financial investment will be a failure.  
 90. One possible concern with granting countries property rights in the talent of their ballplayers 
is whether countries should be compensated for this type of loss at all. This note argues that they 
should be, as a method to prevent MLB teams from unregulated recruitment in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In this way, players end up with more bargaining power when negotiating with MLB 
teams, because a rights-bearing third party with more legal and economic power than the player will 
take an interest in whether he is signed and whether the process is legally proper. In the region the 
recruitment of baseball players has risen to the level of a social, economic, and ethical problem. See, 
e.g., Rosentraub, supra note 16, at 126. 
 The economic and cultural impact of MLB on Latin American countries, such as the 
Dominican Republic and Venezuela, is extensive. . . . Underprivileged Latin American boys 
and their families often see MLB as the way to escape poverty. As a result, the reach of MLB 
into these countries extends to children and affects childhood education and the operation of 
youth baseball leagues. MLB dominance also is evident in how MLB regulates aspects of the 
Latin American professional league operations.  
Id. MLB teams are able to take advantage of the poverty of these children and their lack of contractual 
sophistication to recruit them in ways that are not only harmful to the children, but are also socially 
and culturally damaging within the countries themselves. See generally KLEIN, SUGARBALL, supra 
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effectively compensated the country for its interest in the player talent. At 
that point, compensation for the player will end, and full property rights in 
the talent will transfer to the ballplayer. As such, when a player has met 
existing service requirements in the Major Leagues to achieve free agency 
status, he alone will have the right to determine where, when, and if he 
signs another contract in the Major Leagues.
91  
In a compensation system, each country will be directly financially 
compensated for MLB recruitment of native-born talent.
92
 Recruitment 
will be defined as the point when an MLB team seeks to sign a player and 
bring him within the umbrella of the organization. This payment will be in 
addition to the money the player himself will receive for agreeing to sign a 
contract with the team. A player will be paid what any other similarly 
talented player would earn, and the country will be paid a monetary value 
that is determined at the time that the player contracts with the MLB team. 
Because players will be signed for a salary that reflects their abilities as a 
ballplayer, the country will be compensated in an amount that is 
proportional to the value of the player’s contract. This payment will serve 
as compensation for the social costs of MLB recruitment in the country.
93
 
It is proposed that receiving compensation for the recruitment of these 
baseball players will offset the damages caused by MLB recruitment (i.e., 
Coase’s “social costs”)94 by providing financial resources that can be used 
 
 
note 7, at 34–103. These countries have experienced such negative consequences from MLB’s profit-
driven recruitment that some action must be taken to offset the damage.  
 91. The overall goal here is to keep the country involved in the player’s development in the 
Major Leagues. The purpose for this is to keep an economically and politically sophisticated party 
involved in the player’s contractual relationship until such a time that he is able to fully and 
independently exercise his own rights under existing MLB contractual customs and U.S. contract and 
antitrust law. This note assumes that that point occurs when the player becomes a free agent.  
 92. After a country is compensated for a player’s decision to sign with an MLB team, the 
payment can be used for a variety of purposes. The payments can be general funds collected by the 
country for varied use, or they can be set aside for specific purposes, designated either by legal 
agreements between countries or in negotiations with the individual player. For example, payment may 
be directed to education in countries where access to quality education is a concern for baseball 
recruits; alternatively, all or part of the payment could be set aside to finance the recruited player’s 
future education expenses should he fail to succeed in the Major Leagues. While this solution is 
certainly unusual and would take some effort to organize and effectuate, it is not out of the realm of 
possibility. It would also provide a safety net for a player who, unfamiliar with the likelihood of 
success in the major leagues, and uncertain of what his future would look like if his baseball career 
ends prematurely, might otherwise take significant risks in signing with an MLB team. 
 93. The athletic equivalent of the “brain drain” phenomenon, so to speak. This comes directly 
from Coase’s first solution, in which he proposes that the entity that creates the social costs should 
compensate the entity that bears those costs, in essence paying damages for its activity. See Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, supra note 21, at 2–6. This type of system may also help to repress the 
staggering quantity of young ballplayers entering baseball academies by increasing the total cost to 
MLB teams of each player’s recruitment. 
 94. Id. 
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for educational programs, job training, or other social benefits.
95
 Involving 
the country itself in the negotiation process will also increase the 
likelihood that it will retain some degree of control over the operation of 
baseball within its borders. This will help to disentangle local baseball 
operations from the neocolonial aspects of MLB recruitment in the region 
by shifting control over local baseball operations from MLB teams back 
towards the countries themselves.
96
 Moreover, receiving funds to aid 
future generations of hopeful young ballplayers would be a step towards 
remedying many of the negative social and economic effects of 
unregulated recruitment.  
Logistical issues a compensation system must address are: (1) how and 
when the value of the player’s talent is assessed; (2) when and how the 
compensation is paid; (3) when and how compensation payments can be 
terminated for each individual player; and (4) how such a system should 
be regulated.
97
 These issues will be addressed in turn.  
The first issue is creating a system for determining the value of each 
player’s talent, and thus the contractual payment that an MLB team will 
make to the country, as well as the salary the team will pay to the player. It 
is important to either determine these amounts through the same 
 
 
 95. At least one researcher suggests that MLB should be required to provide education and other 
life skills training to ballplayers in Latin American and Caribbean academies. See Storms, supra note 
15, at 95, 101. However, it may not be feasible or logical to set up, regulate, and finance these social 
services, especially considering the vast number of players in Latin American countries that find 
themselves in baseball academies. A player talent rental system would create a mandatory, 
enforceable, and straightforward transactional financial benefit that could then be used by the 
government of the player’s country to finance social benefits and in some ways ideally remedy the 
detriment caused by MLB’s recruitment. While implementation and regulation would still be a 
challenge, MLB would not be involved in the system beyond making payments, which would make it 
easier for MLB to comply. It could also lessen concerns over how involved MLB should be in 
designing solutions to the problems its actions exacerbate.  
 96. Because currently, MLB operations in these countries serve as lingering reminders of U.S. 
colonialism in the region. See KLEIN, SUGARBALL, supra note 7, at 48. Klein also elaborates on this 
relationship in terms of Dominican baseball, explaining that MLB teams have in many ways 
“hinder[ed] the Dominican game.” Id. at 49.  
 97. In evaluating the possible solutions to these types of issues, it should be considered that:  
[P]roperty rules and the moral rules that support them must be simple and general, at least as 
to the core of property. If the rules for determining access to and use of resources [here, 
baseball players’ talent] required the gathering of detailed information-for example, 
information about the attributes of rival claimants that might otherwise have moral relevance-
this would not produce the stability of expectation needed for widespread coordination.  
Thomas W. Merrill, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1857 (2007). That is to 
say that a system wherein countries are financially compensated for their players should be relatively 
uncomplicated and should have universal rules that pertain to all participants. For example, only MLB, 
the player, and his country of origin are permitted to negotiate over rental of the player’s talent. If the 
system becomes too complicated, not only do transaction costs skyrocket, but the process can easily 
become unwieldy and prohibitively time consuming.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/8
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE SOCIAL COST OF BASEBALL 791 
 
 
 
 
proceeding, or determine the amount of money the player will earn first. 
This will ensure that the country, which will have greater bargaining 
power than the player, is involved until the contract negotiation process 
ends. To enforce the compensation process consistently, the system should 
be as uniform and fair as possible. In this regard, it should be consistent 
throughout all participating countries. The system will also need to 
determine the salary of the individual players consistently. A goal of the 
system should be subjecting all players to the same legal standards and 
protections so that all players are treated equitably.  
The process by which the player’s salary and the country’s 
compensation are determined should be through an arbitration process 
similar to that used for players in the major leagues.
98
 However, unlike in 
the major leagues, the system should not be “final-offer.” A final-offer 
system functions well in the United States, where players are already 
under contract with MLB and thus subject to the protections of the 
MLBPA. A MLBPA player also would retain an agent who is familiar 
with the process and can represent the player’s rights. This gives the 
player significant bargaining power when arbitrating his salary with a 
team. Before they are signed and immigrate to the United States, Latin 
American and Caribbean players are not subject to MLBPA jurisdiction. 
 
 
 98. MLB uses a form of arbitration called “Final-Offer Arbitration.” Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? 
An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential 
Applicability to European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 110 
(2009).  
It functions as follows: In [the MLB arbitration system], players with over 2 years of major 
league system could file for salary arbitration, if they were not under long-term contract. If 
the sides could not come to a contract agreement within a period of time, the club would 
submit a salary figure for the coming season that they felt the player was worth, while the 
player would do like wise [sic]. If the sides could not reach agreement with the figures 
submitted, the parties could go before arbitors [sic] from the National Labor Relations Board 
and present their case. The arbitors [sic] would then rule on one figure or the other. There 
would be no middle ground. The system remains much the same, with a panel of three 
arbitrators ruling on salary cases. 
Id. Maury Brown, Breaking Down How Salary Arbitration Functions in MLB, THE BIZ OF BASEBALL, 
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2916:breaking-down-
how-salary-arbitration-functions-in-mlb&catid=26:editorials&Itemid=39. This system, wherein one 
figure is chosen over the other without any middle ground, is said to encourage negotiation and 
settlement in baseball because each side faces a complete loss if the arbitrator decides against it. 
Thomas Gorman, The Arbitration Process, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, http://www.baseballprospectus. 
com/article.php?articleid=3732. It is said to limit the negotiation “chilling effect” of traditional 
arbitration, wherein each side submits a bid and the arbitrator tends to choose a figure in the middle 
ground. See Chetwynd, Play Ball?, at 111. In the Final-Offer system, even if the parties do not settle 
the end result will still be fair. Id. This is the case because the offer they submit to the arbitrator tends 
to be a conservative one in light of the risk of complete loss should the other side’s number be the 
winning bid. Id. 
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They also may not be able to afford legal assistance. Allowing the 
arbitrator increased discretion in selecting the amount of money the player 
will earn will help to ensure that the player’s contract is fair. This type of 
arbitration system could take one of two forms: (1) a subjective, 
adjudicative arbitration system, wherein arbiters are permitted to make 
wholly subjective determinations of the player’s salary and country’s 
compensation, or (2) a more rigid, objective system that requires an arbiter 
to select both figures based on pre-calculated figures that take into account 
the average salaries of players in similar situations and at similar levels of 
playing ability.  
In an arbitration model, a player’s playing ability would be determined 
by independent arbiters analyzing evidence of the player’s performance, 
much like how the arbitration system works for players drafted by MLB 
who have not attained free agency status.
99
 Under this framework, 
countries and teams would submit their estimate of the player’s talent 
value to an independent arbitral body, which would evaluate various 
factors and assess the compensation rate owed to the country either at one 
of the figures or somewhere between the two.
100
 A similar process would 
determine the salary paid to the player, wherein all three parties (country, 
MLB team, and player) have the opportunity to submit suggested salaries. 
Countries would likely be incentivized to submit higher salary requests for 
players, since a higher salary suggests a greater skill level, which would 
also indicate the country should be compensated at a higher level to offset 
the loss of the player. Mirroring MLB’s arbitration system, talent value 
would be anchored by mirroring minor-league salaries (i.e., the average 
salary range for a given minor league prospect would be roughly 
equivalent to the average salary range for a similar non-draft-eligible 
player).
101
  
 
 
 99. A drafted player with three or more years of service (but less than six) may file for arbitration 
with his team. Frequently Asked Questions, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#arbitration (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). There is an exception to 
this rule for so-called “Super Two” players, who have served for two years plus an additional eighty-
six days, and who rank in the top twenty-two percent of similarly-situated players. Id.  
 100. In the MLB arbitration process:  
[T]he club and player submit their “last best offer” for a salary ahead of time to the Labor 
Relations Department and the Players Association respectively. On “exchange day,” 
representatives from both sides meet in New York and exchange figures one by one. . . . Each 
side gets one hour to present its case. There is a short recess and then each side gets 30 
minutes to rebut the other side’s case and 30 minutes to present their summation.  
Thomas Gorman, The BP Wayback Machine: The Arbitration Process, BASEBALL PROSPECTIVE (Jan. 
18, 2012), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=15864. 
 101. Salaries for minor league players generally have a maximum dollar amount, augmented by 
bonuses paid to players who earn them. Zachary D. Rymer, MLB Must Finally Answer for Exploitation 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/8
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Alternatively, talent value could be based simply on a pre-determined 
scale that takes into account a player’s statistical performance in assessing 
the value of his talent level. This would require the creation of a chart 
showing values ranging from the lowest compensation teams are expected 
to pay to the highest. Talent value could be assessed either by assigning 
tiered values to players within a given range of ability (as a vastly 
oversimplified example, a compensation amount of $100,000 USD might 
be assessed for all players batting between .260 and .275), or value could 
be determined on a sliding scale, taking into account statistical 
performance of the player based on recent games, the compensation 
assessed for players of comparable performance, and other relevant factors 
(such as how quickly the player has improved over time, his age, physical 
health, and so on) to arrive at a compensation figure.  
Second, a compensation system must determine how such 
compensation should be paid. Payment of this compensation could occur 
either a single time, or on a recurring basis. Recurring payments would be 
most desirable, because that would encourage the country to maintain 
involvement with the signed player. This is desirable because until a 
player becomes a free agent, he has limited rights and may still be at risk if 
the bargaining power of his country is removed from the equation.
102
 
Recurring payments could take the form of monthly payments while the 
player is under contract with the MLB team, quarterly payments, or annual 
payments made while the player under contract with the MLB team. Some 
flexibility may be desirable, so that negotiating parties can create a 
payment schedule that operates to the mutual benefit of the parties 
involved. To further encourage all parties to remain involved in the rights 
 
 
in the Minor Leagues, BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 12, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1957838-
mlb-must-finally-answer-for-exploitation-in-the-minor-leagues (“[T]he wage for low-level minor 
leaguers is $1,100 a month. MLB.com says that’s the maximum, not the minimum. And while the pay 
does escalate as players climb the ranks. . . . It’s only to a degree. At Triple-A, the highest minor 
league level, the typical monthly wage is $2,150 a month” [emphasis added]); see also Charlie 
Wilmoth, Minor League Players Still Paid Next to Nothing, SBNATION (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www. 
bucsdugout.com/2013/1/14/3874488/minor-league-baseball-players-still-paid-next-to-nothing (“While 
the Major League minimum salary in 2012 was $480,000, the figure for first-year players, regardless 
of their organization, runs about $1,110 a month during the season” [emphasis added]). 
 102. Paying the compensation to a player’s country will encourage countries to become more 
involved in the contractual arrangements of young players. Further, should difficulties arise between a 
signed player and an MLB team before the player is able to avail himself of the protection of the 
MLBPA, the country would be incentivized to stay involved in the process because it would still have 
a financial stake in the player’s relationship with the MLB team. In this regard, it may also encourage 
countries to create internal legal regimes in order to protect their interest in the value of each player’s 
talent; for example, creating laws allowing the country to legally represent baseball players who are in 
negotiations with MLB teams.  
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and welfare of the signed player, it may be desirable to allow the 
compensation amount to be renegotiated annually at the request of any 
party. 
Another important consideration is how long the compensation amount 
should be a factor in the player’s career. Teams should be required to pay 
compensation for each baseball player recruited in Latin America and the 
Caribbean unless or until the player reaches the Major Leagues and has 
played there for sufficient time to earn free agency status under major 
league rules. Once the player has achieved this Major League skill level, 
any property rights in the player’s talent that the country possesses will 
transfer from the country to the player himself, and he becomes a free 
agent who can negotiate a contract with an MLB team.
103
 This means that 
a country’s property rights would cease at the same time his MLB team no 
longer has the right to restrict his ability to sign with another team, thus 
removing all obstacles to the player’s free agency at the same point in 
time. That is, a Latin American or Caribbean player would earn 
negotiation rights in much the same way as Rule 4 draft-eligible players 
do (an across-the-board six-year period of time during which the player 
cannot lawfully sign with another team or retire without penalty),
104
 but 
his rights would also vest through a system that applies only to Latin 
American and Caribbean players.  
This system would certainly result in higher transactional costs for 
MLB. These costs reflect compensation for the social costs MLB imposes 
on the countries where it recruits young ballplayers. Although MLB teams 
will see an increase in their bottom-line, these costs are unlikely to become 
so prohibitive that MLB stops recruiting in these countries—especially in 
light of the expense of drafting and signing North American players or 
navigating the Japanese system—as the pressure to find the next 
“superstar” will continue to motivate teams to recruit outside the North 
American market.
105
 Alternatively, if an MLB team is unwilling to pay a 
fair and equitable contract price to a Latin talent and compensate the 
player’s government for the negative effects of recruitment, that MLB 
 
 
 103. Paying the compensation to a player’s country will likely encourage countries to become 
more involved in the contractual arrangements of young players. Further, should difficulties arise 
between a signed player and an MLB team before the player is able to avail himself of the protection 
of the MLBPA, the country would be incentivized to stay involved in the process because it would still 
have a financial stake in the player’s relationship with the MLB team. In this regard, it may also 
encourage countries to create internal legal regimes in order to protect their interest in the value of 
each player’s talent; for example, creating laws allowing the country to legally represent baseball 
players who are in negotiations with MLB teams. 
 104. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 75. 
 105. See Zimmer, supra note 24. 
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team will simply be unable to sign the player, and he will have the 
opportunity to sign with another major league team (whether in North 
America or elsewhere) or play locally. MLB teams will be discouraged 
from stockpiling young men because the “boatload mentality” will no 
longer be financially viable. Also, if the player believes that his talents are 
best utilized in the United States, the door would not be closed 
permanently. He would always have the opportunity to follow traditional 
immigration methods to enter the United States, and if necessary establish 
residency and enter MLB through the draft system.
106
  
Implementation of this type of system would not be without challenges. 
One issue is the form of governance that would be used to implement this 
new system.
107
 The use of public and private partnerships is arguably the 
best way to govern the system.
108
 In a public-private partnership system, 
 
 
 106. Players would need to seek admission to the United States through traditional immigration 
methods. The issuance of O, P, or H2-B visas would be limited to players who are recruited under the 
compensation system, so as to reduce the likelihood that MLB teams will seek to circumvent it. This 
would mean that a player who is not recruited under the system could only enter the United States 
using either a family-based visa petition or an employment-based visa petition offered by some other 
employer. See Family-Based Immigrant Visas, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/types/family/family-preference. 
html; see also Employment-based Immigrant Visas, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/types/employment.html. While limiting the 
ballplayer’s opportunities in this way may seem harsh, it is no more restrictive than for any other 
intended immigrant to the United States. Moreover, allowing Latin American and Caribbean players to 
seek an O, P, or H2-B visa through an MLB team that recruited him outside the compensation system 
would not help to reduce recruitment abuses, because it would essentially render the system powerless.  
 107. “There are three basic forms of governance structure that can exist to oversee sports: a 
private-market system, a group-control system, and a public-federalist system.” Rosentraub, supra 
note 16, at 132. Governance can consist of any one of these systems independently or some 
combination of two or more. Id. A private-market system exists where private individuals operate the 
market. Id. All decision-making is done on an individual level. Id. This is essentially how MLB 
recruitment in the Caribbean operates today-MLB teams recruit players in their individual capacity or 
through agents and government involvement is minimal beyond the immigration stage. Id. Group 
governance involves owners of organizations giving control to an oversight entity—this is how MLB 
as a collective operates: all thirty franchises operate under the MLB umbrella. Id. In the Public-
Federalist model, both the individual and governments may work together. Id. The “public-private” 
variation exists where the government controls some aspects of the system while private interests 
control others. Id. at 132–36. 
 108. To implement and encourage these partnerships, some sort of international regulatory body is 
recommended. The simplest option would to employ the International Baseball Federation (IBAF) to 
oversee and implement the process. The Official Site of the International Baseball Federation, 
http://www.ibaf.org/en/. The IBAF is a multi-national organization that currently operates the World 
Baseball Classic, various youth Baseball World Cups, and the Women’s Baseball World Cup. Id. 
Using the IBAF to implement an international dispute resolution system would not be a completely 
novel idea in the sports world. Another, more well-known international sports organization already 
offers a dispute resolution system for teams and players: the Federation Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA). See Dispute Resolution System, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/ 
organisation/footballgovernance/disputeresolutionsystem/index.html. Nor would it be unusual for the 
organization to become involved in improving the international impact of the game. FIFA lists among 
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governments (public entities) and MLB teams (private entities) will work 
together to implement, regulate, and enforce the player-rental system.
109
 In 
this type of situation, the public sector will govern some aspects of player 
movement and recruitment internationally (such as creating procedural 
systems MLB can utilize to pay rent for talent), while other 
responsibilities can fall on MLB (for example, monitoring each team’s 
compliance with visa limitations and rental agreements made with foreign 
governments), or even the individual players (negotiating talent value or 
the terms of the payment of rental value to the government and/or the 
player himself).
110 
 
 
its objectives “to improve the lives of young people and their surrounding communities, to reduce the 
negative impact of our activities and to make the most we can of the positives.” Mission and Statues, 
FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/ mission.html.  
 The significance of adopting an independent regulatory body for baseball should be noted here. A 
player might feel pressured to accept a lower contract rate in the event that his country and the MLB 
team seeking to recruit him collude to harm the player’s interests. Alternatively, a player’s country 
might exploit him if it is incentivized to do so. Ideally, the public’s concern over locally successful 
baseball teams and equitable treatment of individuals by the government would help discourage 
countries from engaging in harmful or unethical activities. However, because the temptation to make 
decisions that are not in the player’s best interest will always exist, oversight by a third party 
regulatory body would be ideal.  
 109. As a comparison to this idea, consider the NCAA, a public-private partnership. For the most 
part, the NCAA is a successful organization that is accepted by consumers:  
[T]he model of U.S. collegiate sports involves conjoint control between the public sector and 
a private group. Specifically, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) controls 
numerous crucial elements of the multibillion dollar college sports industry. Yet, in so far as 
public institutions are concerned, the government controls the supply of franchises and the 
distribution of these franchises.  
Rosentraub, supra note 16, at 132. Adopting this system in countries that have poor political 
relationships with the United States (for example, Cuba) may prove difficult. However, it is likely that 
increased communication between the United States and these countries on a topic that is relatively 
uncontroversial will help to maintain valuable lines of communication despite political tension. 
Because sports entertainment is nearly universally popular worldwide, it serves as an area of 
commonality between countries that might have few other reasons to cooperate. By way of example, 
consider the Olympics, an international sporting event that in 2014 involved eighty-eight countries 
worldwide. At times, Olympic events have been staged successfully even when political tensions are 
high. Nonetheless, the United States is likely to oppose a system requiring MLB teams to financially 
compensate governments that it does not formally acknowledge or support. There may also be 
concerns regarding how a country intends to use compensation paid by MLB teams. Some of these 
concerns might be remedied by adopting a system that is highly specific in terms of how compensation 
operates. This might require the United States to independently negotiate the specifics of the system in 
each country individually (negotiation the use of compensation funds for different purposes in Cuba 
than in the Dominican Republic, for example). These are but a few concerns surrounding the political 
ramifications of a compensation system. Nonetheless, the topic is far too complex to be thoroughly 
addressed in this Note.  
 110. Id. at 136. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to fix the antitrust issues that exist within Major 
League Baseball’s operations in the United States. “Any effort to establish an international amateur 
draft system will trigger antitrust litigation pursuant to the Curt Flood Act.” Gould, supra note 23, at 
116. 
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IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, BENEFITS, AND COMPLICATIONS OF A COASE 
THEOREM-BASED PLAYER-RENTAL SYSTEM 
First, this system does not directly resolve the exploitation problem that 
young baseball players fall victim to in some Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. However, it does attempt to require MLB teams to 
not only pay the players their contractual rate, but to also make payments 
to countries in compensation for the talent the teams recruit in the region, 
a concept that does not exist in other professional sports.
111
 As MLB teams 
incur greater costs for collecting young players in academies, their interest 
in indiscriminately signing those players should go down. In turn, this 
should disincentivize buscones from similarly hoarding talent because 
profit will be less related to quantity and more to the quality of players that 
a buscon offers to a team.  
Resistance to a change in the power structure currently governing 
international player recruitment would be of concern in a rental system, 
particularly on the part of MLB. MLB’s power and influence in the 
baseball world is much greater than that of the countries it recruits talent 
from. Because there is an existing relationship wherein MLB teams 
operate as the franchisor and other countries and their leagues operate as 
franchisees, Major League teams can exact significant power over these 
leagues.
112
 It may be hard to incentivize change to this type of regime 
where MLB is at a distinct advantage in recruiting talent. 
Enforcement is another issue. One potential problem with enforcement 
is that it may prove costly, both for MLB and for the countries that 
participate in such a system. However, while initial costs will likely be 
greater at the time the system is put in place, the long-term benefits of 
such a program should offset the initial difficulty of putting into place and 
enforcing player talent rental. Additionally, when countries are being paid 
for their talent, it will incentivize them to enforce the new regime, so long 
as it is not overly complicated and they benefit from the new system as 
least as much as they did when players were independently subject to 
 
 
 111. Nonetheless, this proposal is modeled off of procedures that currently exist in countries like 
Japan and Mexico for the protection of native talent from MLB teams’ recruitment. See supra notes 53 
and 84. 
 112. Rosentraub, supra note 16, at 137.  
MLB also exercises unfettered international power. Teams conduct business in many nations, 
seeking out and developing talent in ways that maximize the interests of MLB. The MLBPA 
has no authority to deal with the working conditions for major or minor league prospects in 
foreign countries, even when the teams and MLB are involved in these nations. MLBPA 
jurisdiction is limited to players signed to MLB contracts and on the roster of a MLB team.  
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recruitment by MLB without compensation to the country of origin. 
However, it is important to note that the willingness of countries to 
cooperate in a player-rental system cannot be fully realized at this point. 
On that note, international cooperation will be essential to implement 
this type of system. Within a multi-country system, each country can 
cooperate in enforcing the rules against those countries that might resist 
the change.
113
 Nonetheless, it will be necessary to create a legal regime to 
oversee a player-rental system. Two options are: (1) the creation of a 
multilateral treaty, through which each country would enforce the system 
nationally, or; (2) the development of an international organization that 
would independently oversee operations in all participating countries.
114
 
Much as MLB is regulated through federal and state laws in the United 
States, creating an international body or legal framework to control the 
international operation of MLB internationally should help to ensure that 
all parties comply with the new system.
115
  
Another potential issue is how MLB and its teams respond to the new 
concept of compensation for a player’s talent value, as well as the 
increased transactional costs of international player recruitment. MLB and 
many of its teams are likely to resist change, or any type of restriction on 
how recruitment is accomplished. They may seek out enforcement 
 
 
 113. Some Latin American countries may have concerns with signing on to an internationally 
cooperative agreement for a variety of political and non-political reasons. See, e.g., supra notes 55–58. 
Alternatively, MLB may resist the new rules and regulations and attempt to find a way to circumvent 
them. For example, although teams are currently prohibited from signing players under the age of 
seventeen (See Zimmer, supra note 24), there are many well-known accounts of teams signing players 
under seventeen. See, e.g., Vargas, supra note 18, at 26.  
 114. At least one author has taken an international human rights approach to solving baseball’s 
problems in the Dominican Republic:  
American baseball standards for contract signings, training programs and the retention of 
sports agents have not reached the point of jus cogens and must be codified by the Dominican 
Republic if they are to have effect and import there. Thus, the burden falls to the Dominican 
Republic to act on behalf of its own people, as well as to international mechanisms to 
pressure the Dominican Republic to act.  
Zimmer, supra note 24, at 439. Of course, considering the limited and controversial role of jus cogens 
in international law, it is unlikely that sports recruitment would be elevated to that level. Rafael Nieto-
Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law, ICC NOW 
1, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf (last accessed Mar. 28, 2014). 
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether international governmental or non-governmental organizations are 
interested in interfering with international sports recruitment or whether any advisements or decisions 
would be taken seriously by Major League Baseball and the governments it affects.  
 115. However, any regulatory organization should function independently of MLB, as the 
corporation already has strong influence over player recruitment and would be unlikely to act against 
its own interests. Ideally, a regulatory system would be operated jointly by multiple countries (perhaps 
through the Organization of American States), rather than being controlled by a single country or 
organization that might not have the ability or neutrality to make decisions that are beneficial to all 
parties involved.  
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loopholes or recruit in countries outside the jurisdiction of the player-
rental system. Moreover, if property rights in a player’s talent transfer 
after a certain point and teams stop paying compensation, teams may be 
incentivized to find ways to sidestep the payment of rent to foreign 
countries. For example, teams may try to rush players to the major league 
level before they have fully developed, trade less valuable players 
indiscriminately to attempt to keep costs low, or artificially affect player 
rental “value” through subversive methods (such as reducing playing time, 
or moving a player throughout various levels of the minor leagues to 
inflate or decrease his stats). There may also be difficulty in developing a 
system for evaluating a fair compensation value that all parties agree 
appropriately compensates for the social costs of MLB recruitment. The 
effects of player recruitment are extensive, not heavily studied, and by 
nature are not easily measureable.
116
 For a compensation system to be 
functional, it must make sense, and steps must be taken to determine the 
monetary value of the negative effects of MLB recruitment in these 
countries. 
Despite these potential challenges, a player-rental system will provide a 
variety of benefits. For example, it may offer the potential for improved 
international relations.
117
 An economic-based legal relationship could 
eliminate some challenges in United States foreign relations—for 
example, with Venezuela, which may not be amenable to its players 
leaving the country so long as there are minimal benefits to the political 
regime.
118
 This may also help improve U.S. relations with Cuba
119
 if the 
embargo is lifted in the future.
120
  
 
 
 116. How does one determine, for example, how signing a player who turns out to be a major 
league star encourages a negative colonial relationship between that country and the United States, if 
at all? Or to what degree is that compensable, or should it be compensable at all? 
 117. One country of particular importance is Venezuela. Venezuela is a source of a significant 
portion of baseball talent but politically it has an unstable relationship with the United States. See U.S. 
Relations With Venezuela, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ 
ei/bgn/35766.htm; see also Opening Day: Over 28 Percent of MLB Players Are Foreign-Born, supra 
note 18. Time will tell whether political relations with Venezuela will have any impact on the number 
of Venezuelan ballplayers in the Major Leagues.  
 118. Venezuela, which has recently developed strained relations with the United States, is one 
country that has openly criticized MLB’s international recruitment policies: 
June 2000, the Associated Press reported that “[s]ports officials in Caracas, Venezuela, 
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Finally, and most importantly, a player-rental system will benefit 
international baseball players. They will have more negotiating rights, 
their interests will be protected, and they will still be able to play 
professionally in the United States. In general, many concerns surrounding 
the exploitative nature of international recruitment will be redirected 
towards improving and enforcing the player-rental system. Players not 
immigrating to the United States will benefit from more successful leagues 
that have more talent on their rosters, and better conditions generally for 
the countries they reside in. The result will be a more ethical and socially 
responsible global game for future generations of players and fans. 
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